War Termination

Description

Policymakers, academics, and analysts pay far less attention to how wars are terminated than how they begin or how they are waged. At the end of any conflict, the failure to secure an effective and satisfactory peace is not only an insult to those who fought in it, the innocents who suffered in it, and the vast wealth it consumed, it is also a failure of the very purpose of national policy. Robert Levine will explore an example of war termination and peacemaking to tease out the key considerations that policymakers and analysts should take into account before the first bullets fly.

Robert Levine worked in the U.S. Intelligence Community for over 33 years, most of those years at the CIA. As a military analyst, he published studies on Soviet, Warsaw Pact, and successor states' national security policies, threat assessments, strategic intelligence, and military planning for conventional and nuclear operations. Later, he researched and analyzed South Asian national security policies and was the senior military analyst covering regional reactions to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, and the violence and wars that followed. He completed several in-depth, independent studies during his career. These include the first book-length classified study of NATO command post exercises (through the Department of the Air Force, working at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe). Levine was the director of central intelligence representative to the National War College, where he taught courses as a professor of national security and strategy. He was also the director of military analytic training at the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis. He holds a Ph.D. in public policy analysis from the Rand Graduate Institute.

This event is hosted by the Johns Hopkins Center for Advanced Governmental Studies.